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A NOTE ON INTERPRETING CONTRACTS
BERNARD H. GOLDSTEIN *
The recent case of Castellano v. State' provokes reflection upon
the "plain meaning" rule in interpreting contracts and invites in-
quiry on just how far meaning is controlled by lexicography. In
Castellano, the New York Court of Appeals was asked to ascertain
the meaning of a condemnation clause in a lease. The landlord
contended that, in the context of the lease, the word "lessor" should
be read as "lessee"-a reading which would allow the major portion
of the award to go to the landlord. 2 Holding that extrinsic evidence
was admissible to support the landlord's contention, the court con-
cluded that the landlord did not seek reformation of the lease, but
rather, he "requested. . .an interpretation. . . .To carry out the
intention of a contract, words may be transposed, rejected, or sup-
plied, to make its meaning more clear. . . .
Castellano expresses a doctrine that received recognition in an
earlier California case, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas
Drayage and Rigging Co. ,' wherein the Supreme Court of California
allowed extrinsic evidence to be admitted for the purpose of showing
that trade usage in the surety field rendered a contract of indem-
nity, with no exclusion, inapplicable to the claim sub judice.5
In contrast to the rationale of Castellano and Pacific Gas &
Electric stands the New York Court of Appeals decision in Rodolitz
v. Neptune Products.' In Rodolitz, the question presented was the
interpretation of a "stop-tax" clause in a lease. By the terms of the
lease, the tenant agreed to pay the increase in real estate taxes over
a base computed by averaging the taxes for the first 3 years of the
term. The term commenced on the date the certificate of occupancy
was issued, and fortuitously, this date fell on the same year in which
* B.S.S., College of the City of New York, 1927; L.L.B., Columbia Law School, 1930.
Member of the Firm of Tenzer, Greenblatt, Fanon & Kaglan, New York City.
1 43 N.Y.2d 909, 374 N.E.2d 618, 403 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1978).
2 Id. at 911, 374 N.E.2d at 620, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 726. The landlord agrued that a typo-
graphical error caused "lessee" to read "lessor". Id. at 913, 374 N.E.2d at 621, 403 N.Y.S.2d
at 727 (Breitel, C.J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 911, 374 N.E.2d at 620, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 726 (citations omitted).
69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968) (en banc).
The opinion is most interesting because of its supporting references to the classic work
in semantics of Ogden and Richards. Id. at 35 n.2, 442 P.2d at 643 n.2, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 563
n.2 (citing C. OGDEN & I. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING 24-47 (rev. ed. 1956)).
6 22 N.Y.2d 383, 239 N.E.2d 628, 292 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1968).
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building taxes were exempted due to the local assessment formula.
Accordingly, there was a lower base than would have prevailed had
that year not been used. The court of appeals held that, although
the first year of the term embraced only land taxes, it was to be used
in averaging the first 3 years of the base for tax escalation. In con-
trast, the intermediate appellate court had excluded the first year
from the computation.7 Recognizing that the lower court's determi-
nation of the parties' intent could be correct, the court of appeals
nevertheless reversed, stating:
[T]he rule is well settled that a court may not, under the guise of
interpretation, make a new contract for the parties or change the
words of a written contract so as to make it express the real inten-
tion of the parties if to do so would contradict the clearly expressed
language of the contract. . . . I
What is interesting about Rodolitz is that an examination of the
record on appeal reveals that the trial was devoid of any testimony
to show a meaning different from that adopted by the court in its
literal interpretation of the contract, although on the intermediate
appeal the court found language favorable to the landlord elsewhere
in the lease.
The need for stability in the law as a proper foundation for
conduct has been noted by Professor Harry Jones. As he phrased it,
one of the "law's social ends-in-view [is] the maintenance of a
reasonable security of individual expectations."I That this stability
is a central ingredient of commercial activity is recognized in the
rule that disallows going behind a negotiable instrument to show
that the maker is acting only as an agent." In this situation, where
we are dealing with a medium that is the equivalent of currency, the
need for absolute, literal adherence to word symbols is readily ap-
parent. But the question arises whether this same absolute need also
is applicable to the contracts in Pacific Gas & Electric and
Castellano. One might urge, for example, that mortgage lenders rely
on leases as a basis for financing projects, and indemnity contracts
act as inducements for conduct that would not have gone forward
but for the inducement of indemnity. That one "goes by the words"
7 28 App. Div. 2d 859, 281 N.Y.S.2d 381 (2d Dep't 1967).
8 22 N.Y.2d at 386, 239 N.E.2d at 630, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 881 (citations omitted).
I Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 COLUM. L. Rv. 1023, 1026 (1974).
"0 U.C.C. § 3-403(2). As has been stated, an agent's liability under a negotiable instru-
ment "lies almost entirely in the written symbols he uses to disclose his agency status." J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 403 (1972). See also Rotuba Extruders v.
Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 223, 385 N.E.2d 1068, 413 N.Y.S. 2d 141 (1978).
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has been stated in Rodolitz as a fundamental premise in contract
interpretation. Yet, unless the contextual frame of reference is
brought to the attention of the court as we learn from Castellano
and Pacific Gas & Electric, the court is without any aid to derive
meaning other than from words by themselves. Context then as-
sumes a restricted role, as was illustrated in Rodolitz."
By "context" we mean the psychological matrix in which the
words are used or, stated differently, the "recurrent clumps of ex-
perience" upon which we rely for the linkage of the words to ideas. 12
That context is a central ingredient to meaning has been recognized,
of course, as a logical proposition,"3 and similar recognition has man-
ifested itself in judicial interpretation of agreements. 4 But are
Castellano and Pacific Gas & Electric aberrations or are their hold-
ings reconcilable with fundamental assumptions of contract
interpretation?
An examination of the facts in Pacific Gas & Electric and
Castellano suggests that a literal interpretation of the contract in
either case would remove from consideration what human habit and
conduct indicate is a more plausible and rational interpretation,
since we generally view words in context. If we perceive a digression
from what we normally expect, the door is opened to allow extrinsic
evidence to explain the meaning of the words. In such a situation it
may be urged that the "digressive conduct" of the contract poses
an inherent ambiguity which allows the admission of extrinsic evi-
dence to discern the meaning, because the literal reading, while
grammatically correct, is either inconsistent with or irrational in the
light of experience. 5 Extrinsic evidence was allowed in Castellano
" On a motion for summary judgment, opposition on the ground that the contract in
question is ambiguous is insufficient to resist the granting of the motion, unless the defendant
introduces specific extrinsic evidence which indicates that the written agreement has a mean-
ing different from what the words themselves reveal. Where conclusions are merely offered,
the court will restrict interpretation to a literal reading. Mallad Constr. Corp. v. County Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 32 N.Y.2d 285, 290, 298 N.E.2d 96, 99, 344 N.Y.S.2d 925, 930 (1973).
12 C. OGDEN & I. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING 56 (1959 ed.).
, See M. COHEN, A PREFACE TO LOGIC 52 (1944); J. DEWEY, LOGIC, THE THEORY OF INQUIRY
135 (1938).
14 City of Buffalo v. Strong & Co., 304 N.Y. 132, 138, 106 N.E.2d 217, 220 (1952). See
also 4 S. WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 618, at 715-16 (3d ed. 1961).
The central importance of context is also illustrated by the rule that a contract will not
be construed to produce an absurdity. E.g., River View Assocs. v. Sheraton Corp. of America,
27 N.Y.2d 718, 262 N.E.2d 416, 314 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1970), aff'g 33 App. Div. 2d 187, 306
N.Y.S.2d 153 (1st Dep't 1969).
"1 The "no-absurd-construction" rule expressed in River View Assocs. v. Sheraton Corp.
of America, 27 N.Y.2d 718, 262 N.E.2d 416, 314 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1970), see note 13 supra, in a
sense is a recognition of "inherent" ambiguity. The appellate division in River View, in
[Vol. 53:746
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and Pacific Gas & Electric, but none was offered in Rodolitz, requir-
ing the conventional wisdom to fill the role of interpreter.
Where there is no public policy of concern, conduct called for
by contract which digresses from the norm can be given sanction,
provided such a literal interpretation is clearly indicated in the
contract. Thus, when one proposes to digress from habit and normal
conduct, it would be well to acknowledge this in the contract and
that the interpretation is not to be varied from the literal meaning
because of such digression. If such a provision had been placed in
the contract in Pacific Gas & Electric and in Castellano, the reasons
for allowing extraneous testimony would disappear, and the agree-
ment would then be governed by the Rodolitz rule. While it has been
said that the surest way to misinterpret an agreement is to construe
it literally,"'" there is no warping of the contract, if the parties wish
a literal construction.
Finally, we learn from Castellano and Rodolitz that translating
ideas into word symbols is not an easy venture. We must strive to
achieve correspondence between idea and symbol so that the latter
will, to the greatest degree possible, signal the idea and reduce the
probability of misunderstanding.17 When there has been faltering,
however, one must look to the learning in Castellano and in Pacific
Gas & Electric to rescue the engagement-resorting to good advo-
cacy to properly present the extrinsic evidence that will resolve the
ambiguities.
refusing to be bound by a literal reading of the lease in issue, relied upon the general practice
which prevails in the drafting of default clauses in leases. See 33 App. Div. 2d at 190, 306
N.Y.S.2d at 156.
" Giuseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944).
" We must, of course, recognize that even though we strive to state ideas clearly, there
are nevertheless limitations that cannot be overcome. As stated by a leading scholar in the
field of contract law: "It is impossible completely to expunge vagueness and ambiguity from
contract language." Farnsworth, Some Considerations in the Drafting of Agreements: Prob-
lems in Interpretation and Gap-Filling, 23 REc. OF (Ass. OF THE BAR CrrY OF NEW YORK)
(1968).
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